The purpose of this article is to review important monetary developments during the year and to identify, interpret, and assess significant changes in the techniques of monetary management. To this end, major monetary actions are discussed. The new techniques are then treated in more detail. Most of these techniques have been introduced since last spring. Such limited experience in using them does not provide a sufficient basis for evaluating them empirically. This article, therefore, presents an assessment of their potential for monetary management.
The recently released Fifty-Third Annual Report of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Covering Operations for the Year 1966
presents a comprehensive review of economic developments during the year and policy responses to these developments. The Report is the main source for this article, and it contains the current economic directives and continuing authority directives referred to later,
Review oi Federal Reserve

Monetary Actions
The Federal Reserve System's most flexible tool for influencing monetary and credit expansion or contraction is its ability to alter member bank reserves 1w purchasing or selling Government securities. The FOMC issues a "current economic policy directive" every three or four weeks. This directive serves as the Committee's formal statement of policy and provides operating instructions for the Trading Desk. In 1966, as in preceding years, the directive contained three major points. The Committee:
(1) reviewed recent developments in economic and financial conditions relevant to the formulation of monetary policy, (2) indicated broad goals for policy (such as high employment, sustainable economic growth, price stability, and a viable balance of payments), and specified intermediate objectives of monetary expansion to achieve these goals, (8) instructed the Trading Desk to attain a prescribed set of money market conditions that would presumably lead to the desired movements in the intermediate objectives.
Exhibit I (pages 12 and 18) presents the current economic policy directive in effect at the beginning of 1966 and the directives adopted at the Committee's fifteen meetings during last year. This exhibit summarizes chronologically the Committee's view of economic and financial conditions in 1966 (Column 1), its policy decisions in response to these conditions (Column 2). and its operating instructions to the Trading Desk (Column 8). The impact of monetary actions in the short run is frequently measured at two levels-changes in money market conditions and movements in aggregate monetary measures. These measures, however, also reflect fiscal actions and other economic and financial developments, making it difficult to isolate the effect of monetary actions alone.
The chief money market indicators considered in this article are net reserve availability' of member banks (Chart 1), key money market interest rates (Chart 2), rates on large certificates of deposit (Chart 8) , and capital market rates (Chart 4). Aggregate monetary measures considered are rates of expansion in total memnber hToJk reserves ( Chart 5). money stock (Chart 6), mnoney plus time deposits (Chart 7), and commercial hank credit (Chart 8).
An examination of the policy record for 1966 indicates that the year may' appropriateh' he divided into three major periods. These periods are January through April, May' through October, and November and December. Monetary developLnents in each period are reviewed in the next few pages.
January through April-
Desire for Restraint
From January through April, production was approaching capacity, spending was rising rapidly, and prices \vere spiraling upward. The FOMC directives called for increased monetary restraint. Money market conditions became tighter, but most aggregate monetary measures continued to expand at very rapid rates.
As the year began, goals of policy were "to complemnent other recent measures taken to resist the emergence of inflationary pressures and to help restore reasonable equilibrium in the country's balance of payments." In December 1965, the Federal Reserve Board had raised the discount rate from 4 per cent to 4% per cent and the Regulation Q ceiling rate on time deposits fromn 45 per cent to 5% per cent, Open market operations \vere directed to moderate adjustmnents in the money market flowing from these actions.
The Committee continued to state the same broad goals at its first meeting in 1966, hut deleted the phrase "to complement other recent measures taken." The intermediate objective was changed from "accommodating moderate growth" to moderating the growth" in the reserve base, hank credit, and the money supply (Exhibit I, Column 2). This 'was a slight move toward restraint. At the same time, existing money market conditions were to be maintained, chiefly because of the Treasury financing schedule (Exhibit I, Column 8). The broad goals and intermediate objectives of policy were not changed at the next meeting, but the operating instructions called for a move "toward a gradual reduction in reserve availability," still "with appropriate regard for the current Treasury financing." This was a further modest move toward restraint.
The Committee voted at its March 1 meeting to resist "inflationary pressures" rather than "the emergence" of such pressures. Instructions called for "some further gradual reduction in reserve availability." In April, the Committee changed its intermediate objectives to "restricting the growth in the reserve base, bank credit, and the money supply" rather than just "moderating" such gro\vth.
Money market conditions tightened significantly from January to April. Net reserve availability had fallen to minus $250 million by the end of the period (Chart 1). This contrasted with an almost balanced net reserve position in December and January (when the System was accommodating adjustments to the discount rate increase) and was about $100 million lower than average net reserve availability during the latter months of 1965.
Most market interest rates rose from December to April, indicating firmer market conditions (Chart 2). The three-month Treasury bill rate and the effective rate on Federal funds were slightly above the discount rate. Offering rates on large certificates of deposit had risen sharply, following the change in the Regulation 9 ceiling rate which had previously prevented further increases (Chart 8). Capital market rates, which frequently respond slowly to changing market conditions, rose significantly (Chart 4).
While money market conditions became markedly tighter, most aggregate monetary measures continued to expand rapidly. Total member hank reserves and money each increased at an annual rate of almost 7 per cent from December to April (Charts 5 and 6). Money plus time deposits increased at an 8 per cent rate, and bank credit increased at a 9 per cent rate (Charts 7 and 8). Each of these rates~vas high by historical standards.
Aggregate monetary measures increased rapidly, while money market conditions tightened significantly; this fact suggests that rapidly rising economic' activity in early 1966 and its accompanying great demand for credit from both the private and public sectors were the main cause of money market tightening. In response to these economic forces, interest rates and member hank borrowing from the Federal Reserve rose significantly. System actions, in retrospect, were not sufficiently restrictive to stem the rapidly expanding loan demand, and monetary aggregates rose sharply. These actions, however, were taken at a time when public opinion was concerned about rising interest rates, and monetary policy was generally criticized for being too restrictive-not too expansionary.
iflav through OctoberEffective Restraint
Total demand for goods and services continued to exceed available supply from May throm.mgh Oetoher. Policy was more aggressively directed toward restraining total demand; it called for restricting growth in the aggregate monetary' measures. The System employed several innovations to help implement its policy \\'ithin the context of a rapidly changing economnie situation. During this period, measures of aggregate monetary' variables moved more consistently with the desires of the Committee than they had earlier in the year.
The directive adopted at the May 10 meeting altered the hroad goals of policy only slightly, hut it included a significant change in the operating instructions-the introduction of the "proviso clause." This clause modified the instruction for "attaining some further gradual reduction in net reserve availability" by calling for "a greater reduction if growth in required reserves does not moderate substantially." The proviso clause represents one of the most important innovations of the year and is discussed further in a later section of this article. Each subsequent directive during the year included a modifying clause of this type (italicized clauses in Exhibit I, Column 8).
The directives adopted at the next several meetings made no change in the broad goals of policy. The June 7 version called for maintaining recent money market conditions unless required reserves expanded considerahly more than expected. In such a ease, the manager was directed to seek a further firming in market conditions. The expected movements mentioned in the proviso clause referred to projections made by the Committee's staff for presentation at each FOMC meeting and updated between meetings.
On June 27, the Federal Reserve Board introduced for the first time differential reserve requirements by class of time deposits. The Board announced that reserve requirements on certificates and most other forms of time deposits in excess of $5 million at each member hank would be raised from 4 per cent to 5 per cent in July (Exhibit II). Reserve requirements on savings deposits and the first 85 million of time deposits were left at 4 per cent. Introduction of the differential was prompted in part by the aggressiveness of banks in Page 11
Exhibit I seeking new time deposits. Banks competed for these funds in order to meet rising loan demands without further reducing their liquidity positions. Because of increased competition from commercial banks, there was some concern that savings and loan associations might have large run-offs in their savings accounts after their midsummer dividend dates. Such run-offs would put further pressure on mortgage markets, which had already become extremely tight. The increase in reserve requirements was designed to moderate competition from commercial banks and thereby reduce potential run-offs at savings and loan associations and mntnal savings banks.
FEDERAL OPEN MARKET COMMITTEE CURRENT ECONOMIC POLICY DIRECTIVES
Both business and Government demands for credit were increasing rapidly in early summer. Capital markets had been deluged with new issues. These circumstances, in addition to the pressure on savings institutions, led to the inclusion in the June 28 directive of a provision for changes in net reserve availability and market conditions "needed to moderate unusual liquidity pressures at financial institutions," Restraint was to be exercised, hut orderly market conditions were to be maintained.
The Federal Reserve Board announced on August 17 that reserve requirements for time deposits in excess of $5 million at each member hank would be raised further to a level of 6 per cent in September. This increased the differential in requirements by type of time deposit.
The August 23 directive reflected mounting strain in the financial markets, citing the "maintenance of orderly money market conditions and the moderation of unusual liquidity pressures" as a constraint on operations, Beginning with this directive, bank credit replaced required reserves as the operating guide specified in the proviso clause. The reserve base, hank credit, and the money' supply were still cited as intermediate objectives.
The Presidents of the Federal Reserve Banks sent a letter to each member bank on September 1 regarding the administration of the discount facilities. This letter requested the banks to restrict expansion of their business loans and to avoid "dumping" their municipal security holdings (Exhibit II). It also offered assistance in financing current security holdings through use of the discom3t window. This was intended to help curb inflationary pressures financed by hank credit and to contribute to more orderly market conditions. At the time, there was a great deal of concern for the viability of the money' and credit markets. Problems of meeting huge current and prospective credit demands in a climate of System restraining actions were the chief cause of such concern.
Other branches of the Federal Government also took action in earl>' September that helped to stabilize the economy and to moderate the upward trend in interest rates. The tax credit for business investment was snspended, and provisions for accelerated depreciation were curtailed. Steps \vere taken to reduce the ilnpaet of Federal agency financing on the credit markets, The FOMC's September 13 directive cited the new fiscal program as a major factor influencing monetary policy. The phrase "by restricting the growth in the reserve base, bank credit, and the money supply" was deleted from the statement of policy. Bank credit, the operating guide in the proviso clause, thus became the only aggregate monetary measure mentioned in the directive. The operating instructions called for "maintaining firm hut orderly conditions in the money market; provided, however, that operations shall he modified in the light of unusual liquidity pressures or of any apparently significant deviations of bank credit from current expectations." The same instructions were repeated in the October 4 directive, At both of these meetings, some of the Committee members favored relaxing slightly the degree of restraint. No formal change in policy was made, hut significant deviations in bank credit mentioned in the proviso clause referred to slower growth than expected as well as to more rapid gro\vth.
On September 26, following the passage of enabling legislation, the Federal Reserve Board reduced the ceiling rate on time deposits of less than $100,000 to 5 per cent (Exhibit II). Similar actions applying to financial institutions under their respective jurisdictions were taken by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the Federal Home Loan Bank Board.
Money market conditions and changes in the rates of monetary expansion both indicate that a considerable measure of restraint developed in the May to October period. Net reserve~availability was generally in the lower range established in late spring (Chart 1). Most interest rates rose at a faster pace than in the preceding period with man>' reaching their highest levels in forty' years. Federal funds and Treasury hills traded well above the discount rate during most of the period (Chart 2). Large certificates of deposit were offered at the 5% per cent ceiling rate, and the secondary market rate on these deposits rose considerably above the ceiling rate (Chart 3). Capital xnarket rates also rose sharply as large issues competed for limited funds (Chart 4).
During the period there were suhstantial changes from the general practices of administering the dliscount rate and ceiling rates on time deposits. The discount rate has usually heen changed whenever mar-
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Che,l 4 Capital Market Rates ket rates were considerably above or below it. By mid-1966, the discount rate was out of contact with most market rates. and this situation persisted for several months. Furthermore, this period marked one of the few times that the ceiling rate allowed on time deposits was not raised when offering rates on these deposits were at the ceiling for a prolonged time. It was the first time that the rate ceiling led to a significant reduction in the volume of large negotiable certificates of deposit outstanding since these cleposits became such an important source of funds for commercial banks.
The rates of monetary expansion showed the effect of restrictive monetary policy (Charts 5, 6, 7, 8) . From April to October, total reserves declined at a 2.3 per cent annual rate, and money' declined at-a 1.5 per cent rate. Money' plus tune deposits increased at only' a 2.6 per cent rate, and bank eredlit growth slowed td) a 5.3 per cent rate, The sharp contraction in the volume of certificates of deposit outstanding was an i;nportant factor contributing to the slower rates of expansion of total deposits and hank credit.
During this period, the Federal Reserve reduced markedly' the rate at which it was supplying funds to the market. The System was not aeensumnodating the great demand for funds to the extent it had earlier in the y'ear. As a result, interest rates rose sharpl>', and rates of monetary expansion declined abruptly.
j\'overnber and Dccc rnberD esire for Ease
Late in 1966, as the economic expansion appeared to be slowing, the Federal Open Market Committee stated a somewhat easier policy. Monetary restraint in the previous period, as indicated by lack of growth in hank reserves and money, slower growth in bank credit, and markedly higher interest rates, had helped curtail the excessive demand for goods and services.
Bank credit had not increased during October, in contrast to earlier expectations and Committee desires for some expansion. Following instructions in the proviso clause of the October 4 directive, the Desk permitted somewhat less firm market conditions to develop prior to the November 1 FOMC meeting. At that meeting the Committee voted to relax slightly the degree of restraint. Policy was "to maintain money and credit conditions conducive to the restraint of inflationary pressures and progress toward reasonable equilibrium in the country's balance of payments." The operating instructions shifted emphasis from "maintaining firm hut orderly conditions in the money market to "maintaining generally steady conditions in the money market; provided, however, that operations shall be modified. -. in the light of hank credit developlnents during the month."
The next two directives provided more overt moves toward less restraint. The broad goals of policy, to "maintain" and then to "foster money and credit conditions conducive to noninflationary economic expansion," were to be achieved by "attaining somewhat easier conditions in the money market, unless bank credit appears to be resuming a rapid rate of expansion.
On December 27, the Presidents of the Federal Reserve Banks rescinded the September 1 letter. Its provisions were no longer deemed applicable because of changes in economic and financial conditions. During late 1966 and early 1967, money market condlitions became easier. Most rates of monetary expansion showed little change by the end of the year, but rose significantly in the first few months of 1967. Net reserve availability increased as member hank borrowings from the Federal Reserve declined to the level of early 1966 and fell even lower in early 1967 (Chart 1). Money market rates dropped from their peaks, but remained at high levels by most past standards (Chart 2). Rates on certificates of deposit fell below the ceiling, and commercial banks were again able to attract these funds (Chart 3). Capital market rates declined only slightly in December, hut went do'svn more significantly in early 1967 (Chart 4).
Only a slight easing response in aggregate monetary measures was evident by the year's end (Charts 5, 6, 7, 8) . Total reserves and money responded slowly to the change in policy. Bank credit started to expand, but at first this reflected almost solely gro\vth in time deposits. This renewed intermediation of banks was facilitated by dleclines in mark-ct rates not subject to 
Methods of Monetary Management
The foregoing review of monetary developments during 1966 and early 1967 has pointed out several significant innovations in policy implementation. The new techniques may be divided into two categories: those related to open market operations and those involving complementary actions. This section discusses the new techniques and sets forth an assessment of each.
Innovations in Open Market Operations
Economic and Financial Conditions Specified More
Clearly in the Directives Beginning in mid-1966, the directive became more specific in identifying the economic and financial conditions the Committee considered in formulating policy. The wording of the first part of the directive, which cites these conditions (Exhibit I, Column 1), was changed substantially at many of the meetings. By comparison, dlireetives earlier in the year and in previous years containedi less detailed descriptions of economic and financial conditions, These descriptions were modified more frequently in 1966 than in most previous years, reflecting in part the rapid pace at which economic conditions were changing. 2
Beginning with the June 7 directive, specific mention was made of such factors as the liquidity of nonhank financial institutions, conditions in the mortgage markets, and declining automobile sales. Later directives The more complete summaries of economic and financial conditions in the directives provide the public with a concise record of those developments which the Committee considered most important. From this standpoint alone they are a valuable contribution. More importantly, these summaries focus the attention of the Committee and the Desk on the major issues concerning the nation's economic progress, as well as on the day-to-day problems of influencing money market conditions.
Proviso Clause Jntroduced and Developed
The introduction of the proviso clause was a most significant step forward in monetary management. This clause focuses on the linkage between money market conditions and movements in aggregate monetary measures -a linkage that needs to be more fully understood and more frequently considered in monetary management.
The proviso clause generally stated that open market operations between FOMC meetings were to be based on a prescribed set of money market conditions, provided that a specified aggregate monetary measure behaved in a particular way. If the operating guide did not behave as expected, the Desk was to effect appropriate changes in money market conditions. Previously, the Committee had stated its desired objectives for monetary and credit expansion in general terms but gave its instructions to the Desk only in terms of money market conditions. 3
The clause was introduced on May 10, following a prolonged period when money and bank credit had expanded rapidly (contrary to FOMC desires) even though money market conditions had become progressively tighter (as the Committee had instructed). As pointed out previously, growing credit demands led to rapid monetary expansion even though market conditions tightened. Such results highlight the difficulty of projecting a consistent relationship between money market conditions and aggregate monetary measures.
In retrospect, policy may have moved to restrain growth in monetary aggregates at too slow a pace from January to April, probably because of the concentration on money market conditions. The System supplied reserves to prevent even tighter market conditions from developing in response to sharply rising credit demands. Such actions led to rapid expansion in reserves and resulted in larger growth rates of money and bank credit than were desirable for the inflationary economic situation of early last year. These actions prevented interest rates fromn rising as sharply as economic forces at the time would otherwise have dictated.
The proviso clause was designed to help achieve desired changes in monetary aggregates at a time of rapidly changing demands for credit. It supplies a means for adjusting open market operations more swiftly to shifts in the linkages between money market conditions and aggregate monetary variables which result from changes in economic activity and expectations. In the past, the FOMC usually changed its instructions to the Desk regarding money market conditions at its periodic meetings-a rather slow process of trial and error during periods of rapid economic change. The proviso clause, in contrast, instructs the Desk Manager to change desired money market conditions between meetings. It directs him to alter the money market guide if new information indicates that the intermediate operating guide is not behaving in the desired manner. The provisions of the clause specify Committee desires more clearly over a broader range of measures, permitting changes in the short-run measures between meetings.
The proviso clause itself went through several changes during the year. The operating guide cited in the clause from May through mid-August was required reserves. In the following months it was bank credit.
A new measure, the bank credit proxy, was developed during the year in order to get current information about the operating guide more frequently. This measure infers changes in member bank loans and investments (assets) from changes in member hank deposits (liahilities). 4 Deposit data are available weekly on a daily average basis, whereas bank credit data are available less frequently.
Chest 6
Money Stock
At times during the year the Committee altered the direction of change in the operating guide of the proviso clause. From May through August the clause was used to effect firmer market conditions if the operating guide expanded more rapidly than desired, By contrast, the September 13 and October 4 directives called for operations to be "modified in the light of ... any apparently significant deviations of hank credit from current expectations," as the Commnittee sought to resist a major change in either direction. Instructions in the November 1 directive were to he modified "in light of bank credit developments during the month," a double-edged proviso. On November 22, the Committee decided on a less restrictive policy, ". . -attaining somewhat easier conditions in the mnoney market, unless bank credit appears to be resumning a rapid rate of expansion." During the rest of the year, the clause was used as a safety valve to insure that the pace of monetary expansion did not exceed the Committee's desire, Because the proviso clause is still too new to evaluate its actual effectiveness, this discussion deals mostly with its potential. The clause acknowledges formally that gradual and infrequent changes in money market conditions may not always result in desired movements in the aggregate measures. Therefore, it directs the Desk Manager to consider the most recent developments in the specified aggregate mneasure when interpreting his instructions concerning desired money market conditions. Effective use of the proviso clause might help to prevent another situation like the one in 1.960-61. At that time, money market conditions became easier, following Committee instructions, but the reserve base and money stock continued to decline for several months, contrary to FOMC desires. In retrospect, this happened because the economy was sliding into a recession, which by itself caused easier money market conditions. By focusing on the pace of market changes every three or four weeks and by not permitting more rapid changes in market conditions, System actions resulted in an undesired contraction of bank reserves and the money stock.
Use of the clause is an improvement over former practices because it provides the Desk with a specific rule for modifying the desired market conditions stated in the directive. One aggregate monetary measure is selected as an operating guide; its behavior then deter-150 mines for the Desk when and how desired market 145 conditions should be changed.
In the past, several aggregate measures were mentioned as intermediate objectives, but they often behaved differently in the short run. This ambiguity made it difficult for the FOMC, the Desk, and the public to decide whether the specific intermediate goals of policy were being met.
Selecting one intermediate measure as an operating guide reduces this problem, but intensifies the importance of selecting the most appropriate one. Presumably, with perfect knowledge of all the interrelationships among financial and real variables, any broad measure which can be controlled by the monetary authorities would be as useful as any other. However, our knowledge of these interrelationships is limited. Meanwhile, the problem remains of finding the operating guide whose movements show most clearly the thrust of monetary actions on the economy. At present, there is no general agreement among monetary economists as to which measure best serves this purpose.
The Committee first selected required reserves as the operating guide and later switched to bank credit, Other aggregate measures frequently cited by monetary economists, including the money stock and the reserve base, were not used in the clause. This does not mean, however, that all other aggregate measures were ignored in the formulation of policy. Each member of the FOMC had a set of measures which he considered most important for monetary management and which influenced his evaluation of desired behavior for the operating guide actually selected.
An additional effect of the proviso clause is to permit the Committee to give instructions to the Desk that are applicable for slightly longer periods. The Commnittee is able to focus its attention more directly on Pc rcnotee es e,e en', si ro 0, s't chengo belween months ', od ,,inni.
Le's,t den plotted, Mench pretimloory economic developments and the proper gi-owth in intermediate measures rather than on day-to-day fluctuations in market factors.
Policy Changed More Continuously
Changes in open market policy were called for on a more continuous basis in 1966 than in most previous years. The Committee tended to make more frequent and more gradual changes in its stated policy even though there was only one change in basic direction. In previous years, moves were often made in more discrete jumps.°I n the first half of the year, the Committee called for gradual moves toward more restraint. By the end of the year, the Committee directed gradual moves toward less restraint. Increasing emphasis was placed on the proviso clause following its introduction in May. Use of the clause, in itself, may reduce the need for more discrete policy changes in terms of money market conditions.
Treasury financing schedules were referred to in seven of the fifteen directives issued in 1966 (Exhibit I, Column 3). Movements in market interest rates indicate, however, that the traditional policy of maintaining an "even keel" during such finaneings may have been relaxed somewhat. During the February refunding and prefunding operations, interest rates rose sharply. Market conditions became firmer in May, and interest rates moved higher immediately prior to the Treasury's refunding. Interest rates increased very rapidly after completion of the August Treasury financing. A slight increase in yields followed the early November refunding. In contrast to these experiences, many interest rates declined around the time of the Treasury refunding in January 1967.
Changes in market interest rates during these financings reflected market developments which were only partially offset by the System rather than policy actions. Prior to 1966, little variation in rates occurred during such periods. Treasury finaneings were scheduled so frequently that they often presented a major obstacle to implementing policy changes. Even~vith moderate rate variations during its financings in 1966, the Treasury was able to obtain the funds it needed and the market suffered no great adverse effects.
Operating Instruments More Varied
In response to a variety of special challenges during the year, adjustments were made in the types of transactions included in open market operations. 
Money Stock Plus Time Deposits
The simplest type of open market transaction is the outright purchase or sale of Government securities by the System. Another type of transaction is the repurchase agreement. In this ease, the System buys Government securities from a dealer, agreeing to sell the same issues back at a specified price and \vithin a specified time, not longer than fifteen days. In effect, the System supplies reserves to the banking system on a temporary basis. Since the dealers have the option of buying the securities back from the System before the agreement matures, the additional reserves are often withdrawn if other factors lead to increased reserve availability in the banking sector. The Committee's continuing authority directive, which sets regulations for open market transactions, formerly restricted repurchase agreements under most circumstances to Government securities maturing within two years. On June 28, the Committee voted to remove this restriction, giving the Desk authority to make repurchase agreements on other Tieasury issues. This proved helpful at times when there was a scarcity of Treasury bills and other short-term Government securities in the market, such as in the late summer of last year
The matched sale-purchase transaction was first used in July 1966. In this type of transaction, the System receives payment from the dealers for securities it sells temporarily, thereby absorbing reserves from the banking system. This technique was first used to offset large temporary increases in float (and in reserves) caused by the airline strike in July. Large outright Page 19 sales of securities by the System at that time might have been misinterpreted as a move toward an even more stringent policy, and might have had undesired effects on market expectations.
Development of matched sale-purchase transactions along with the use of repurchase agreements facilitated the smoothing of market pressures. The Desk was able to provide or absorb reserves in substantial volumes for short periods more quickly and easily than formerly and with less effect on market expectations.
There was some concern in the third quarter of 1966 that even temporary fluctuations in market pressure would have significant-and undesirable-effects on market conditions and expectations. High interest rates and financing costs had led to a sharp curtaihnent of dealer inventories, making the market more sensitive to slight changes in the supply of or demand for securities. Repurchase agreements and matched sale-purchase transactions provided considerable flexibility for Exhibit II open market operations under these circumstances.
On November 1, the Committee revised the continuing authority directive to enable the Desk to make repurchase agreements on securities that were direct obligations of or fully guaranteed by U. S. Government agencies. This action followed Congressional legislation making such securities eligible for purchase by the System. A few repurchase agreements involving agency securities were made after the authorization was given, but they represented only a small portion of total System repurchase agreements.
Actions Complementing Open Market Operations
Frequently during the year, the Federal Reserve used methods other than open market operations to implement monetary policy. Selective changes in System regulations, reserve requirements, and administration of the discount facilities were adopted in 1966. Page 20
Time Deposit Growth Restricted by Interest Rate Ceiling
The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, through its Regulation Q, sets the maximum rates which member banks are allowed to pay on time and savings deposits. In previous years, the System had never used this power to affect very greatly the growth of time and savings deposits. Each time that rates reached the maximum, the maximum was raised.
As noted earlier, the Board raised the maximum rate allowed on time deposits other than savings from 4h per cent to 5% per cent in December 1965. In succeeding months, offering rates on time deposits rose rapidly. By summer, they reached the ceiling rate, and the regulation restricted time deposit growth.
Thereafter, the only change in Regulation Q was to lower the rate limit on certain types of time deposits (Exhibit II) The Federal Reserve maintained the 5% per cent ceiling rate on time deposits even though yields on competitive market instruments and secondary market rates on certificates of deposit (CD's) rose substantially above this rate by the end of the summer. Commercial banks experienced a sharp net loss of large CD's after August. Total time deposits declined slightly from September to November. This loss of deposits can be attributed largely to the bite of Regulation Q.
The effects of the regulation thus contributed to the slower growth of bank credit in the fall of 1966.
The economic impact of this action is less clear; presumably most savings continued to flow to investors through avenues other than commercial banks. As market rates rose above the maximum rates that commercial banks and other regulated intermediaries were allowed to pay on deposits, funds tended to flow directly into the financial markets rather than going through these intermediaries.
Differential Reserve Requirements Established on
Time Deposits
In July 1966, for the first time, reserve requirements were established for one type of time deposits that were different than those for other types (Exhibit II). There is no clear-cut way to estimate the effect of these differential reserve requirements on economic stabilization, Higher costs may have made large banks somewhat less eager to seek time deposits. Also, these higher requirements absorbed some reserves, reducing the amount available to support demand deposits and bank credit unless offset by open market operations.
Possibly the major significance of these acts was that they indicated to the public the Federal Reserve's Chsrl 5 Total Bank Credit All Commerciol Banks concern about the financial conditions then developing, particularly with regard to mortgage markets. The selective aspect of these changes, which excluded the first $5 million of time deposits at each bank from the higher requirements, illustrated the Board's desire to moderate deposit expansion at the large banks without affecting smaller banks.
Discount Rate Maintained Below Market Rates
The absence of a change in the discount rate in the fall of 1966 was a marked departure from practices over the past few decades. It placed a greater burden on administration of the Reserve Banks' discount windows. Throughout 1966, the discount rate remained at the 4% per cent level established in December 1965. This rate was clearly out of contact with market rates during most of the year (Chart 2).~When this happened in the past, the discount rate was usually brought into line with market rates.
The Federal funds rate was almost continuously above the discount rate, with the margin increasing through late summer. From the viewpoint of an individual hank, buying Federal funds is a close substitute for borrowing from the Reserve Banks. Such transactions represent one member bank's making an overnight loan to another member bank.
Formerly, the market-determined rate on such transactions was near the administered discount rate, usu- The September 1 letter sent by the Presidents of the Reserve Banks to each member hank in their district suggested closer administration of Federal Reserve lending and moral suasion. The letter mentioned the availability of the discount windo\v to member banks which cooperated in moderating their expansion of business loans and their disposition of some other assets.
This letter, which was in effect until late December, created mnch uncertainty in the banking system and in the financial markets, It represented a seldom used approach to administering the discount windo\v. Suggestions by the lender of last resort are taken very seriously (sometimes even more seriously than intended) when the market is anticipating fui-ther reduction in the availability of funds. The volume of hank borrowing from the Federal Reserve Banks did not increase significantly, even though market rates were high relative to the discount rate, This suggests that some member banks mistakenly interpreted the letter as a threat to their use of the discount window, Business loans, which had increased at an 18 per cent annual rate from mid-1965 to Angust 1966, grew at only a 6 per cent rate from August to December, This change of trend was probably due largely to the rapid decline of CI) money during the period, There is thus some question as to how much of the moderation of growth in business loans was attributable to the September 1 letter. Business loans at large banks, for example, had declined for several weeks before the first letter was issued.
The 1966 experience demonstrated that the discount rate can be maintained at a rate substantially below market rates. Such conditions, however, require more discretionary administration of the discount window and provide subsidies to banks that do borrow, Limiting the desire to borrow through discount rate adjustments seems preferable from most points of view.
Summary and Conclusions
With the perspective of a few months, it appears that stated monetary policy during 1966 was generally appropriate under very challenging and rapidly changing economic conditions. At times during the year, the process of attaining policy objectives in tersns of the aggregate monetary measures remained slow. From January to April, monetary expansion was excessive despite the stated policy of restraint. From May to October, aggregate measures generally moved more consistently with Committee desires. Toward the end of this period, the Committee apparently would have preferred some moderate expansion in these measures. In November and December, monetary expansion may have been weaker than desired. Monetary expansion did accelerate in early 1967, so the lag svas moderate relative to most past experience. Progress was thus made in shortening the lag between policy decisions and changes in the aggregate measures.
During 1966, both new and seldom used techniques of monetary management were added to the more standard procedures to help achieve policy objectives. For example, innovations in the use of actions complementing open market operations allowed the System to exercise considerable restraint while maintaining orderly mag-ket conditions. Treasury financings apparently do not present as great an obstacle to policy changes as thought in many previous years. The moderate interest rate changes which occurred during the financings in 1966 had no great adverse effect on the market or on the Treasury's ability to secure funds.
A wider variety of transactions available for open market operations also provided the System with greater operating flexibility.
To many economists, however, the most important new technique for monetary management was the proviso clause, After its adoption in May, the rates of monetary expansion appeared more in line with the Committee's desires than they had earlier in the year. But even \vith the proviso clause, there was a significant lag between the change in policy in Tate the lag at that time. It called for a change in desired money market conditions only if monetary expansion proceeded too rapidly. In retrospect, the lag mnight have been shorter if the provision had been for greater easing of market conditions if bank credit expansion was not rapid enough.
The use of the proviso clause emphasizes the need for selecting the most useful operating guide for policy. It also emphasizes the need to understand more fully the relationships between money market conditions and the operating guide and among those aggregate monetary measures which might be used as operating guides. System research efforts in 1966 continued to be directed toward studying these linkages.
Questions might be raised about the use of hank credit as the intermediate guide, especially in view of the fluctuations in the rates of change in commercial bank intermediation. These fluctuations occurred chiefly because of changes in market rates relative to the Regulation Q ceiling and probably had little effect on the total volume of credit available to borrowers. Deleting the reserve base and money supply as specified intermediate objectives may have been undesirable. There is considerable evidence that changes in these measures show snore clearly the thrust of monetary actions on the economy.
The proviso clause places the Federal Reserve System, through its official policy actions, on record as recognizing that measures of money market conditions taken alone are not a sufficient guide even for short-run monetary management. B ank reserves, money, and hank credit have been the chief measures of monetary actions over periods of several months. Now their importance in analyzing week-to-week developments is becoming more apparent. ELAINE R. GOLDSTEIN LEO~ALL C. ANDERSEN
